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Abstract
This study examines excess risk-adjusted returns generated by mid-cap firms with an average
market equity between $2.4 billion and $5.5 billion in 2017. Researchers have heavily studied the smallfirm effect since its identification in the early 1980s, leading investors to overweight small-cap securities.
Additional investments in the small-cap segment caused the small-cap anomaly to weaken. This study
finds that excess returns of small-cap firms compared to mid-cap firms are not statistically significant in
the periods 1946 – 2017 and 1982 -2017. However, mid-cap firms generate significantly higher 3-year
average returns relative to small and large-cap firms after the initial identification of the small-cap
anomaly (1982 – 2017). Further, mid-cap securities generate a higher risk-adjusted return after the
small-cap anomaly was identified. This study hypothesizes the mid-cap anomaly results from greater
growth potential for mid-caps relative to large-caps while still being large enough to weather economic
storms. This study also hypothesizes that non-size related factors have the largest impact on the midcap segment. The results support the existence of a mid-cap anomaly; however, the results suggest the
anomaly is not a result of the growth potential of firms within the segment. Additionally, the results
suggest non-size related factors such as book-to-market and operating profitability have the smallest
impact on mid-cap securities. Therefore, this study concludes excess returns generated by mid-cap
securities represent a true anomaly that is not dependent upon non-size related factors.
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I.

Introduction
Background of the Issue
Researchers frequently attempt to exploit market anomalies, and scholars critically

analyze anomalies following their identification. The small-cap anomaly identified by Banz
(1980) is one of the most heavily studied market anomalies. Banz’s findings suggest a sizepremium exists where smaller firms generate excess returns. Although the study identified the
anomaly, it lacked an explanation of causation. Scholars attempted to identify likely causes of
the anomaly in the decades following the publication. Many hypotheses and arguments were
constructed as supporting contributions to the small-cap anomaly, and researchers attempted to
identify causal relationships. Others argued the small-cap anomaly was identified on the basis of
inherent miscalculations, and published articles contradicting the results of Banz’s publication.
Although various researchers disagreed with the anomaly, the identification of the small-cap
anomaly led investors and equity fund managers to overweight small-cap securities in the
following years, eventually leading to the weakening of the small-cap anomaly.

Research Objective
The extensive research of small-cap securities in the years following the identification of
the small-cap anomaly resulted in neglect of mid-cap securities. The research objective of this
study is to identify a mid-cap anomaly in the time period following the identification of the
small-cap anomaly in 1980. The study will fulfill this objective if the results suggest mid-cap
securities generate larger risk-adjusted returns and significantly larger average returns than small
and large-cap securities. Another objective of this study is to identify factors that contribute to
the mid-cap anomaly. This study hypothesizes that growing securities’ growth potential
outweighs the decline potential of declining firms within the mid-cap segment. The study also
5

hypothesizes that non-size related factors increase variability among mid-cap securities more
than among small and large firms. Factors that influence the variability of returns include the
Book-to-Market (B/M) ratio and Operating Profitability (OP) of a firm for the purposes of this
study.

II.

Literature Review
The Small-Firm Effect
Investors, analysts, and researchers often attempt to identify mispriced securities and

market anomalies to generate excess returns. The “market efficiency hypothesis suggests that
market… prices fully reflect all available information,” and that investors are unable to
outperform the market (Latif et al., 2011). However, history suggests markets fail to follow the
market efficiency hypothesis, and “these deviations are called anomalies” (Latif et al., 2011).
Researchers have studied various market anomalies comprehensively in recent decades,
and the small-cap anomaly is one of the most researched. Banz (1980) initially identified the
small-cap anomaly by analyzing historical returns based on the market equity of firms. The study
found “the common stock of small firms had, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than the
common stock of large firms.” After the identification of the small-firm effect, numerous
researchers supported the findings and attempted to identify causation of the anomaly. Fama and
French (1992) found, “tests do not support the central prediction… that average stock returns are
positively related to market beta,” but market size is critical in determining security returns;
specifically, “size and book-to-market equity seem to describe the cross-section of average stock
returns.” French also illustrates, “part of the size effect in the simple regressions is due to the fact
that small… stocks are more likely to have high book-to-market ratios, and part of the simple
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book-to-market effect is due to the fact that high [book-to-market] stocks tend to be small.” The
findings highlight an inherent correlation between market equity and the B/M ratio, making one
incapable of isolating market equity or the B/M ratio for analysis.
Elfakhani and Zaher (1998) hypothesized the small size of firms serves as a proxy for
differential information between small firms and large firms. Because there is less publicly
available information regarding small firms, the study suggests researchers and investors should
expect a larger risk premium for smaller firms. The scholars conclude, a “joint size-firm neglect
effect” exists, from which “the size effect does not exist separately,” but excess returns for smallcap securities are a direct result of firm neglect (Zaher, Elfakhani, 1998). Nathan (1996) also
hypothesized the small-firm effect could be explained through the differential in market
information for small and large firms, and found, “the small firm effect can be entirely explained
by differential information availability among firms.” On the other hand, Chan, Chen, and Hsieh
(1983) argued that proper risk adjustment measures would explain the higher returns of small
firms, and concluded that the small-firm anomaly can be captured using a multifactor pricing
model.
Although many researchers reached conclusions in support of the small-firm effect,
others have disagreed with its findings. Basu (1981) argued that small firms earn a “marginally
higher risk-adjusted return than the common stock of large NYSE firms,” but this “size effect
virtually disappears when returns are controlled for differences in Earnings to Price ratios.”
Essentially, excess returns are not only a result of size, but are a result of the differences in
Earnings to Price between securities. Roll (1981) also expressed his dissatisfaction with the
small-firm effect, and found that investors trade small firms less frequently than they trade larger
firms. Lower trading volume leads to “downward biased measures of portfolio risk and
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overestimates of ‘risk adjusted’ average returns.” In other words, an inaccurate calculation of
risk is inherent within the findings that support the small-firm effect.
Berk (1995) agrees that small firms outperform large firms, but he finds the difference in
performance can be explained by the difference in reaction to news amongst highly leveraged
small and large firms. Following his first article, Berk (1997) argues, “Modern financial theory
predicts that when there is no relation in the economy between firm size and return, the relation
between firm market value and return will be negative.” The conclusion suggests that market
value is “not only a measure of a firm’s size, but also a measure of a firm’s discount rate.”
Therefore, scholars have associated market value with excess returns, when the firm’s discount
rate is likely the cause of excess returns.

The Neglect of Mid-Cap Securities
Many scholars agree the small-cap segment has not generated the impressive returns
recently that it has historically. Increased awareness following the identification of the small-cap
anomaly led investors to overweight small firms, causing the anomaly to weaken. Horowitz,
Loughran, and Savin (2000) analyzed the periods 1963 – 1981 and 1982 – 1999, and observed an
“annualized return difference between small and large firms over 13% [for the earlier period],
compared to a negative 2% return differential from 1982 - 1999.” The failure of small-cap firms
to outperform large firms in the more recent period supports the claim that the small-firm effect
disappeared following its identification. The authors hypothesized, “as investors became aware
of the size effect, small firm prices increased (thus lowering subsequent returns),” and “the
recent increase in passive indexation… has given more weight to the largest capitalization firms
at the expense of smaller firms.” The authors published an additional article in 2000, concluding
the “results show that the widespread use of size in asset pricing is unwarranted.”
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T. Rowe Price (2007) also published an article that suggested there was “a significant
downside to small-cap stocks at the current time, but… the best days of the small-cap cycle are
probably behind [investors].” The company believes excess returns generated by small firms are
largely historical. Schwert (2003) suggests anomalies commonly weaken following their
identification, stating, “The size effect, the value effect, the weekend effect, and the dividend
yield effect seem to have weakened or disappeared after the papers that highlighted them were
published.”
Although the small-cap anomaly has weakened since its identification, arguments
concerning size as a critical factor continue. Some researchers argue that market equity remains
an important factor if utilized in combination with non-size related factors. Asness, Cliff, Israel,
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2015) acknowledge the limitations of the small-cap anomaly, such as
a “weak historical record, significant variation over time, in particular weakening after its
discovery in the early 1980’s, and [a concentration] among microcap stocks.” However, the
researchers conclude that size is a valuable factor given investors control for the quality of firms
in which they invest.
Comprehensive analysis of the small-cap anomaly has left the mid-cap segment of the
market ignored in recent years. Although many researchers have overlooked the mid-cap
segment, some notable researchers have focused their work on the segment. For example,
Schwartz (2014) suggests, “Mid-caps tend to be something of a forgotten size segment” (p. 1).
Although the investment community tends to focus on small and large-cap firms, Schwartz
believes mid-cap securities play a critical role within investment portfolios, and provide
comparable returns and lower risk.
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Farrell (2017) found “over the past 10 years, mid-caps have generated better returns
(7.86%) than small caps (7.06%) and have taken on less risk.” Not only can mid-cap firms
generate higher returns, but they can also lower the risk of a portfolio. Further, Trainor (2017)
argues, “the small size anomaly is simply not present over the last 30+ years,” and concludes,
“the most consistent fund class appears to be mid-cap stocks that do relatively well regardless of
the time period.” Trainor does not suggest mid-cap firms generate the largest returns often, but
that the lower volatility of mid-cap securities causes them to perform well irrespective of the
period analyzed.
There are various schools of thought regarding market equity as a screening tool.
However, the literature suggests the anomaly has weakened over the past 30-years, and scholars
have ignored mid-cap securities during the period. As presented by Trainor, an unidentified midcap anomaly has the potential to replace the small-firm effect. Because mid-cap stocks have
exemplified excess returns and extremely limited volatility in recent periods, the segment’s
return/risk measures are even more impressive than those of small and large-cap firms.

III.

Methodology
Data
This study examines the mid-cap anomaly using historical returns from Kenneth R.

French’s security data library. Monthly returns are available from July 1926 through July 2017.
The study excludes returns prior to July 1946 due to missing data and the inherent volatility of
securities during early years. The study also excludes any securities with unavailable historical
returns or market equity information.
Initial monthly returns are organized using a univariate sort based on market equity. The
data is sorted into 10 deciles based on market equity, and the 10 portfolios “are constructed…
10

using the June market equity and NYSE breakpoints” (French). Securities with a market equity
in the lowest 10% have an average equity value of $118 million as of January 2017. Small-cap
mutual funds traditionally invest in firms much larger than $118 million. For example, the
Vanguard Small-Cap Index Fund Investor Shares (NAESX) fund has a median market
capitalization of $4.2 billion. Because active mutual funds have difficulties trading such small
securities, firms with a market capitalization in the lowest 10% are excluded from analysis. The
remaining nine market equity deciles are distributed equivalently into small, mid, and large-cap
segments. For comparative analysis purposes, the study also examines the period 1982 – 2017.
The later period encompasses a time in which the small-cap anomaly had become common
knowledge within the research and investment communities.
Additional return data is obtained from French’s database, and is organized by two
bivariate sorts based on market equity and another variable factor. One set is “100 Portfolios
Formed on Size and Book-to-Market,” and historical returns are arranged by the intersection of
“10 portfolios formed on size (Market Equity) and 10 portfolios formed on the ratio of book
equity to market equity (French).” The second set of data is “100 portfolios Formed on Size and
Operating Profitability,” and the portfolios comprise “the intersections of 10 portfolios formed
on size and 10 portfolios formed on profitability (OP).” The study utilizes the B/M ratio as a
factor because Fama and French suggest the ratio predicts expected returns. The study also
analyzes operating profitability as a factor because firms with high profitability have historically
generated excess returns. The study analyzes 1982 – 2017 for the B/M and OP data.
Results are evaluated using similar risk and return measures. Return measures include
average return, minimum return, and maximum return, and risk measures include standard
deviation and Value at Risk. The formula to calculate average returns is,
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1

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = {1 + 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛}𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑 − 1
The minimum return is the lowest return during the period, and the maximum is the highest
return. The standard deviation measures the dispersion of returns in various periods. The
standard deviation is given as,
1

2
𝜎 = √𝑁 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)

where N is the number of observations, xi is the observed values, and μ is the mean value of the
observations. This study utilizes the historical method for all Value-at-risk (VAR) calculations.
Analyzing historical data increases the inherent risk of the calculation because historical returns
cannot predict future returns. However, historical returns are easily accessible for analysis. All
VAR calculations are performed at the 95% significance level, and the result is the amount that
5% of the total observations are below. The Sharpe Ratio is calculated to provide a risk-adjusted
measure of return, and is given as,
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =

𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑝

Where 𝑟𝑝 is the average portfolio return, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, and 𝜎𝑝 is the portfolio standard
deviation. The St. Louis Federal Reserve was accessed to calculate all risk free rates. The
average 90-day Treasury-Bill rate from 1946 – 2017 is 4.05%, and the average 90-day rate from
1982 – 2017 is 3.89%.
The study also evaluates historical mutual fund returns to further analyze the volatility of
mid-cap returns as they relate to mutual funds. Analysis of historical mutual fund returns within
the study should support the results of historical mutual fund securities. Morningstar’s mutual
fund database was utilized to gather data (Fund Category Performance). Mutual funds are
categorized by the intersection of size and investment type. To remove duplicate fund returns,
12

this study analyzes one mutual fund in each investment category from each mutual fund family.
The sample periods for mutual fund returns are the most recent three and five-year periods, and
all mutual fund returns are calculated as simple averages. The database provides individual fund
returns and aggregate fund segment returns. The growth and value premium are calculated using
aggregated fund segment returns.

Statistics
The study uses a two-sample t-test to determine if the difference between average returns
is significant, and assumes all returns are normally distributed. The hypothesis test is 𝐻 0 : the
mean returns between analyzed segments are not significantly different. The alternative
hypothesis is 𝐻1 : the mean returns of the two segments are significantly different. All statistical
tests are performed at the 95% significance level, and the degrees of freedom (df) is calculated as
the smaller of 𝑛1 − 1 and 𝑛2 − 1. The t-stat is given as,
𝑡=

𝑥1 − ̅̅̅
̅̅̅
𝑥2
𝑠2 𝑠2
√ 1+ 2
𝑛1 𝑛2

where ̅̅̅
𝑥1 and ̅̅̅
𝑥2 are the mean returns, 𝑠12 and 𝑠22 are the respective variances, and 𝑛1 and 𝑛2
represent the number of observations in each population. If the t-stat is greater than the critical tvalue, the null hypothesis is rejected and the average returns are assumed to be significantly
different.
The study uses regression analysis to determine the significance of B/M and Operating
Profitability in relation to average returns. The calculation for the test statistic through regression
analysis is given as,
𝑏

T-Stat = 𝑠 1
𝑏
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where 𝑏1 represents the slope of the regression and 𝑠𝑏 represents the standard error of the slope
coefficient. The analyzed factor (B/M and OP) is significant if the resulting p-value is below
0.05.

IV.

Results
The Mid-Cap Anomaly
The suggested weakening of the small-cap anomaly led scholars to revisit market equity’s

impact on returns, and a handful of researchers suggest mid-cap securities generate excess
returns following the small-cap anomaly’s identification. Table 1 presents annualized returns and
risk measures from 1946 – 2017. The results are organized into deciles based on market equity.
Table 1: Annualized performance and risk measures based on a univariate sort of size.
Returns for each decile are analyzed for the period 1946 – 2017.
Decile Returns (1946 - 2017)
Decile

2nd Decile

Average 12 Month Rolling Return

3rd Decile

4th Decile

5th Decile

6th Decile

7th Decile

8th Decile

9th Decile 10th Decile

14.71%

15.09%

14.60%

14.61%

14.23%

14.32%

13.79%

13.16%

11.70%

Minimum 12 Month Rolling Return

-47.08%

-43.07%

-40.72%

-43.04%

-40.84%

-46.08%

-44.72%

-47.21%

-41.20%

Max. 12 Month Rolling Return

101.64%

95.47%

94.59%

93.03%

83.45%

81.03%

69.98%

64.25%

55.95%

24.86%

22.34%

21.85%

21.10%

19.86%

19.92%

18.46%

17.13%

16.33%

Std. Deviation - 12 Month Rolling
Average 36 Month Rolling Return

13.15%

13.80%

13.42%

13.44%

13.22%

13.29%

12.81%

12.34%

10.99%

Minimum 36 Month Rolling Return
Maximum 36 Month Rolling Return

-23.33%
69.11%

-21.03%
59.27%

-19.97%
55.47%

-19.34%
45.62%

-17.33%
45.43%

-18.38%
46.18%

-16.69%
37.00%

-16.25%
34.03%

-18.76%
35.23%

Std. Deviation - Annualized 36 Month Rolling12.52%

11.01%

10.96%

10.36%

9.59%

9.47%

8.61%

8.66%

9.57%

Deciles 2 – 5 generate the highest average 1-year returns, illustrating the small-firm
effect. From 1946 – 2017, firms with the lowest market equity generate the largest average 1year returns, and returns decrease as market equity increases. For example, decile 8 generated an
average 1-year return of 13.79%, compared with 14.61% by decile 5. Because minimum 1-year
returns are mixed, no pattern is identified. However, deciles 2 - 4 generate the largest maximum
1-year returns, at 101.64%, 95.47%, and 94.59% respectively. The results suggest small-cap
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firms generate larger average and maximum 1-year returns. This is also shown by the fact smallcap firms have the highest standard deviation.
The results shift slightly when observing 3-year periods. Small-cap and mid-cap firms
generate mixed 3-year average returns. Because the average returns are mixed, the data suggests
small-cap firms fail to generate noticeably larger 3-year returns than mid-cap firms do. The
large-cap segment has the lowest average 1- and 3-year returns. More extreme minimum and
maximum 3–year returns suggest small-cap firms experience higher volatility than mid-cap and
large-cap firms do. Excluding decile 10, the 3-year standard deviation decreases inversely with
market equity suggesting smaller securities pose higher risk.
The study organizes average returns into low, mid, and large-cap classifications as set
forth in the methodology. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results and provide risk and return
measures.
Table 2: Annualized return and risk measures are calculated for small, mid, and large-cap
securities. Returns are based on 1-year periods extending from 1946 – 2017.
Rolling 1-Year Annualized Returns (1946 - 2017)
Low 30%
Average Rolling 1-Year Returns
Minimum 1-Year Return
Maximum 1-Year Return
Standard Deviation
Value at Risk (95%)
Sharpe Ratio

Mid 30%
14.76%
-42.48%
96.15%
22.43%
-20.78%
0.48

High 30%
14.35%
-43.56%
84.33%
19.96%
-18.24%
0.52

12.07%
-42.45%
58.51%
16.35%
-15.61%
0.49

Small-cap securities generate the largest average 1-year return from 1946 - 2017. Table 2
suggests the average return decreases as market equity increases during the period. Mid-cap
firms generate a slightly lower minimum 1-year return than small and large-cap firms. Small-cap
securities generate the highest maximum return during the period, but also generate the highest
standard deviation and worst Value at Risk. The Sharpe Ratio is used as a risk-adjusted measure
of return, and mid-cap securities have the highest Sharpe Ratio. The resulting Sharpe Ratios
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indicate mid-cap securities generate the highest 1-year risk-adjusted return between 1946 and
2017.
Table 3: Annualized return and risk measures are observed for small, mid, and large-cap
securities from 1946 – 2017. All returns are based on 3-year periods.
Rolling 3-Year Annualized Returns (1946 - 2017)
Low 30%
Average Annualized 3-Year Returns
Minimum Annualized 3-Year Return
Maximum Annualized 3-Year Return
Annualized Standard Deviation
Value at Risk (95%)
Sharpe Ratio

Mid 30%
13.49%
-21.00%
59.47%
11.18%
-7.21%
0.84

Top 30%
13.31%
-18.18%
45.82%
9.54%
-5.78%
0.97

11.34%
-17.02%
32.85%
9.13%
-5.72%
0.80

The results are similar when analyzing 3-year rolling annualized returns, and Table 3
suggests average returns again function inversely with market equity. Small-cap firms generate
the most extreme minimum and maximum returns. Small-cap securities also have the highest 3year standard deviation and Value at Risk, suggesting higher returns of small firms come at the
expense of higher risk measures. Again, mid-cap securities generate the highest Sharpe Ratio
based on 3-year returns. Therefore, mid-cap securities generate a higher risk-adjusted return than
small and large firms during the period.
The results in tables 2 and 3 suggest smaller firms do generate excess returns, and
average 1- and 3-year returns function inversely with market equity. However, small-cap firms
also generate higher risk measures, and small-cap firms do not generate the highest risk-adjusted
return. The study utilizes a statistical t-test to determine if the difference in average returns of
small, mid, and large firms is statistically significant. The difference in average 1-year returns of
small firms and mid-cap firms produces a test statistic of 0.281, and the difference in average 3year returns results in a test statistic of 0.25, both of which fail to exceed the critical value of
1.65. Therefore, although the average returns of small-cap firms are larger than mid-cap firms,
the excess returns generated by small-cap firms are not significantly larger than the returns
generated by mid-cap firms. However, the 1- and 3-year average returns of small-cap and mid16

cap firms are significantly larger than the average returns of large-cap firms. Therefore, small
and mid-cap firms significantly outperform large-cap firms, but small-cap firms fail to
significantly outperform mid-cap firms. Because small-cap firms fail to significantly outperform
mid-cap firms, the results suggest there is a small and mid-cap premium in comparison to large
firms, but there is no size premium between small and mid-cap firms.
Table 4: Annualized performance and risk measures are presented based on a univariate
sort of size. 1-year and 3-year returns are analyzed from 1982 – 2017.
Decile Returns (1982 - 2017)
Decile
Average 1-Year Rolling Return

2nd Decile

3rd Decile

4th Decile

5th Decile

6th Decile

7th Decile

8th Decile

9th Decile 10th Decile

13.25%

14.15%

13.04%

14.12%

14.08%

14.45%

14.16%

13.86%

12.48%

Minimum 1-Year Rolling Return

-44.63%

-43.07%

-37.95%

-43.04%

-36.10%

-46.08%

-44.72%

-47.21%

-41.20%

Max. 1-Year Rolling Return

101.64%

95.47%

94.59%

93.03%

83.45%

81.03%

69.98%

64.25%

55.95%

Std. Deviation - 1-Year Rolling

23.65%

21.09%

20.19%

20.62%

19.08%

19.44%

18.61%

17.48%

17.26%

Average 3-Year Rolling Return

11.65%

12.87%

12.14%

12.98%

13.20%

13.50%

13.11%

13.01%

11.70%

Minimum 3-Year Rolling Return

-21.97%

-17.84%

-16.43%

-15.41%

-11.69%

-17.74%

-16.69%

-16.25%

-18.76%

36.08%

35.05%

37.40%

35.30%

33.42%

31.56%

33.13%

33.49%

35.23%

9.78%

8.79%

8.95%

8.77%

8.40%

8.78%

8.29%

8.81%

11.01%

Max. 3-Year Rolling Return
Std. Deviation - Annualized 3-Year

This study analyzes the period 1982 – 2017 for comparison purposes, and decile return
and risk measures are presented in table 4. Excluding decile 3, mid-cap deciles generate higher
1-year average returns than small-cap deciles. For example, deciles 5, 6, and 7 have average 1year returns of 14.12%, 14.08%, and 14.45%, compared with 13.25% and 13.04% for deciles 2
and 4. Deciles with larger market equity generate the lowest minimum 1-year returns, and smallcap securities generate the largest maximum 1-year returns. Small-cap deciles have the highest 1year standard deviations, at 23.65%, 21.09%, and 20.19% respectively. Studying 3-year returns,
deciles 5-7 generate the highest average returns. 3-year minimum returns yield mixed results, as
the smallest minimum 3-year returns are scattered among market equity segments. The 3-year
standard deviation of small-cap securities is again larger than the standard deviation of mid-cap
firms and large-cap firms. Tables 5 and 6 display risk and return measures based on market
equity segments.
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Table 5: Annualized performance and risk measures are shown. Small, mid, and large-cap
segments are analyzed based on 1-year periods from 1982 – 2017.
Rolling 1-Year Annualized Returns (1982 - 2017)
Low 30%
Average Rolling 1-Year Returns
Minimum 1-Year Return
Maximum 1-Year Return
Standard Deviation
Value at Risk (95%)
Sharpe Ratio

Mid 30%
13.40%
-40.81%
96.15%
20.92%
-18.62%
0.45

Top 30%
14.27%
-42.30%
84.33%
19.36%
-15.94%
0.54

12.73%
-42.45%
58.51%
17.07%
-18.91%
0.52

Table 6: Annualized performance and risk measures are shown. Small, mid, and large-cap
segments are analyzed based on 3-year periods from 1982 – 2017.
Rolling 3-Year Annualized Returns (1982 - 2017)
Low 30%
Average Rolling 3-Year Returns
Minimum 3-Year Return
Maximum 3-Year Return
Standard Deviation
Value at Risk (95%)
Sharpe Ratio

Mid 30%
12.27%
-17.87%
36.30%
8.88%
6.40%
0.94

Top 30%
13.33%
-15.29%
32.31%
8.46%
6.60%
1.12

11.95%
-17.02%
32.85%
10.24%
9.00%
0.79

Based on table 5, small and mid-cap securities generate larger average 1-year returns than largecap firms from 1982 - 2017. Small and mid-cap firms generate average 1-year returns of 13.4%
and 14.27%, compared with 12.73% for large-cap firms. However, the average 1-year return of
mid-cap firms is larger than the average return for small-cap firms during the period. Large-cap
firms generate the lowest 1-year minimum return during the period, and small-cap firms generate
the highest maximum return at 96.15%. The standard deviation decreases as market equity
increases. For example, mid-cap firms had a standard deviation of 19.36%, and large-cap firms
had a standard deviation of 17.07%. Further, mid-cap securities generate a higher Sharpe Ratio
than small and large firms based on 1-year returns. Additionally, mid-cap firms have the best 1year VAR and the highest 3-year average return during the period, at -15.94% and 13.33%
respectively. Mid-cap securities have the lowest 3-year standard deviation and a slightly higher
VAR than small-cap securities. Again, mid-cap firms have the highest Sharpe Ratio at 1.12.
The results suggest mid-cap securities outperform small and large-cap firms during the
period 1982 – 2017. Mid-cap firms generate the highest average 1- and 3-year returns during the
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period, and generate lower risk measures than small-cap firms. Further, the mid-cap segment has
the highest Sharpe Ratio in both tables, suggesting mid-cap firms generated the highest riskadjusted returns from 1982 – 2017. Statistical t-tests were performed on 1- and 3-year returns to
determine statistical significance. The difference in 1- and 3-year average returns of small and
large-cap securities is insignificant, and the difference in 1-year returns of mid-cap firms
compared to small and large-cap firms is also insignificant. However, 3-year returns generated
by mid-cap firms are significantly larger than the returns generated by small-cap firms and largecap firms. Not only do mid-cap firms generate the highest risk-adjusted returns, but they also
generate larger average 3-year returns that are significantly larger than the returns of small and
large-cap securities.
Small firms generate higher average returns than mid-cap and large-cap firms from 1946
- 2017; however, the excess returns are not statistically significant. Therefore, the small-cap
anomaly is not statistically significant from 1946 – 2017. In the period following the small-cap
anomaly’s identification (1982 – 2017), mid-cap firms generated significantly larger 3-year
returns than small and large firms. Not only do small firms fail to significantly outperform from
1946 – 2017, but mid-cap firms generate significantly larger returns than small and large-cap
firms from 1982 – 2017. The results suggest a mid-cap anomaly exists in the period following
the identification of the small-cap anomaly (1982 – 2017).
The literature suggests that mid-cap firms may not outperform year-over-year, but they
tend to outperform over longer periods. To assess this theory, the study calculates the percentage
of periods each market equity segment generates the highest and lowest return in both periods.
Arguments in favor of mid-cap securities often stem from lower volatility, suggesting the
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likelihood of outperformance increases when securities are held for longer periods. The
distribution of the highest and lowest returns in the period 1946 – 2017 are presented in table 7.
Table 7: Distribution of highest and lowest returns by market equity. 1-, 3-, and 5-year
periods are presented for the period 1946 – 2017.
Small-Cap
Mid-Cap
Large-Cap

1-Year Rolling Returns (1946 - 2017)
Periods with Highest Return
Periods with Lowest Return
40.63%
38.88%
19.44%
11.29%
39.93%
49.83%

Small-Cap
Mid-Cap
Large-Cap

3-Year Rolling Returns (1946 - 2017)
Periods with Highest Return
Periods with Lowest Return
41.09%
40.40%
17.23%
9.08%
41.68%
50.52%

Small-Cap
Mid-Cap
Large-Cap

5-Year Rolling Returns (1946 - 2017)
Periods with Highest Return
Periods with Lowest Return
42.03%
39.23%
21.77%
3.84%
36.20%
56.93%

The results suggests mid-cap firms generate the highest or lowest 1-year return less often
than small and large firms do. Small-cap firms generate the largest 1-year return most often, and
large-cap firms generate the lowest 1-year return most frequently. Either small or large firms
generate the largest 1-year return 80.56% of the time during the period, and generate the smallest
return 88.71% of the time. When analyzing 5-year periods, mid-cap firms generate the largest
return 21.77% of the time and the lowest return 3.84% of the time. These results suggest mid-cap
securities outperform small-cap and large-cap securities more frequently when held for longer
periods. In addition, the likelihood of mid-cap securities performing worse decreases over longer
periods. The same calculations were performed for the period 1982 – 2017, and are presented in
table 8.
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Table 8: Illustrates the distribution of highest and lowest returns by market equity. 1-, 3-,
and 5-year periods are presented for the period 1982 – 2017.
Small-Cap
Mid-Cap
Large-Cap

1-Year Rolling Returns (1982 - 2017)
Periods with Highest Return
Periods with Lowest Return
31.61%
44.69%
28.07%
9.54%
40.33%
45.78%

Small-Cap
Mid-Cap
Large-Cap

3-Year Rolling Returns (1982 - 2017)
Periods with Highest Return
Periods with Lowest Return
21.53%
51.50%
35.42%
3.54%
43.05%
44.96%

Small-Cap
Mid-Cap
Large-Cap

5-Year Rolling Returns (1982 - 2017)
Periods with Highest Return
Periods with Lowest Return
17.17%
48.23%
44.69%
1.91%
38.15%
49.86%

Following the identification of the small-cap anomaly, large firms generated the highest and
lowest 1-year return most often. Mid-cap firms generated the largest 5-year return most often,
and generated the lowest 5-year return only 1.91% of the time from 1982 – 2017.
The results provide strong evidence that small-firms underperform mid-cap firms from
1982 – 2017. Following the anomaly’s identification, the small-cap segment generated the
highest 3- and 5-year return less often than mid-cap and large-cap firms did, and small-cap firms
generated the lowest return more often in the later period than the earlier period. The data
supports the disappearance of the small-cap anomaly and illustrates the existence of the mid-cap
anomaly from 1982 – 2017. During the entire period (1946 – 2017), mid-cap firms generated the
highest 1-, 3-, and 5-year returns less often than small and large firms did. However, mid-cap
firms generated the highest 5-year returns more frequently than any other segment since the
identification of the small-cap anomaly. The percentage of 5-year periods mid-cap firms generate
the lowest return also decreases from 3.84% during the entire period to 1.91% following the
identification of the anomaly.

21

The data suggests mid-cap firms rarely outperform, but more rarely underperform, in any
given year. Because of the lower volatility of mid-cap firms, their 3- and 5-year geometric
returns are normally the best, and generate the highest average return. The results appear
strongest over the past 35 years. Therefore, mid-cap stocks appear to be more attractive than
small and large-cap stocks for the typical buy-and-hold investor. The results suggest a mid-cap
anomaly exists, and it has generated its strongest results following the identification of the small
cap anomaly.

Mid-Cap Security Growth Potential
This study hypothesizes that growing firms within the mid-cap segment lead to the
generation of excess returns and the mid-cap anomaly. Mid-cap firms generally enter the
segment after being classified as a small-cap or large-cap firm. Firms that are declining
conventionally enter the mid-cap segment after being classified as a large-cap firm, and growing
firms enter the mid-cap segment after being classified as a small-cap firm. The study
hypothesizes that growing firms generate excess returns because the growth potential is
unlimited, but the loss potential for declining firms is limited at 100%. Therefore, the upside
potential of growing mid-cap firms outweighs the downside potential of declining firms.
Data was gathered from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to test the
hypothesis. Based on a univariate sort of size, small and large-cap firms are excluded from the
results in order to focus on the mid-cap segment. Monthly returns from 1927 – 2016 are
presented in table 9. A hypothetical mid-cap portfolio was created that excludes firms that were
classified as large-cap firms the prior year. The CRSP database was utilized to create the
hypothetical portfolio. To support the hypothesis, average returns of the hypothetical portfolio
should generate significantly larger monthly returns than the historical portfolio.
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Table 9: Historical average monthly returns for the period 1927 – 2017 are observed for
mid-cap securities.
1927 - 2016 Returns
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Average Monthly Return
1.18%
1.12%
1.09%

Table 10: Theoretical average monthly returns of mid-cap securities for the period 1927 –
2017 are observed, excluding firms that were classified as large-cap firms in the prior year.
1927 - 2016 Returns (Hypothetical Portfolio)
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Average Monthly Return
1.20%
1.14%
1.10%

The hypothetical portfolio does yield higher monthly returns. Each decile under review generates
a higher average monthly return in the hypothetical portfolio than in the historical portfolio.
Statistical t-tests are performed to determine if the excess returns of the hypothetical portfolio are
significant. T-tests were performed for deciles 5, 6, and 7, and resulted in respective test statistics
of 0.06, 0.06, and 0.03. Because each test statistic is smaller than the critical t-value of 1.65, the
excess returns generated by the hypothetical portfolio are not statistically significant. The results
suggest the growth potential of firms in the mid-cap segment is not a significant cause of the
mid-cap anomaly, and the results fail to support the hypothesis.

B/M and Operating Profitability as Critical Factors
Although the results suggest the growth potential of mid-cap firms is not a significant
factor of the anomaly, this study also analyzes the effect of the B/M ratio and OP on average
returns. This study hypothesizes non-size related factors cause greater variation of returns in the
mid-cap segment, leading to excess returns. Essentially, non-size related factors have a greater
impact on mid-cap firms than on small-cap and large-cap firms. To support this hypothesis, the
significance of B/M and OP on average returns should be greater for mid-cap securities than
small and large-cap securities. The study analyzes the period 1982 – 2017, and returns are sorted
by B/M and OP. The B/M ratio is used because French identified a “simple book to market
premium,” and it has been suggested that firms with higher B/M ratios generate excess returns.
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In addition, OP was selected because firms with high OP have traditionally outperformed firms
with low OP.
The study analyzes portfolios formed on the bivariate sort of size and B/M first. The
study excludes securities with market equity and B/M in the lowest 10% due to the small size of
these firms that generally preclude them from being held by most ETFs or mutual funds. Table
11 presents annualized returns.
Table 11: Annualized average returns for the period 1982 - 2017 are presented based on
100 portfolios created through a bivariate sort on size and B/M. The smallest 10% of
securities based on Market Equity and Book-to-Market are excluded.

Small-Cap
Low 30% B/M 11.73%
Mid 30% B/M 15.02%
High 30% B/M 13.74%

Mid-Cap
Low 30% B/M 13.40%
Mid 30% B/M 13.93%
High 30% B/M 14.33%

Large-Cap
Low 30% B/M 12.91%
Mid 30% B/M 11.30%
High 30% B/M 11.61%

Table 11 suggests average returns are inversely related to the B/M ratio for large-cap firms. For
example, average returns decrease from 12.91% for the low 30% B/M, to 11.61% for the high
30% B/M. These results suggest the B/M ratio is not a significant factor for large-cap securities.
After further analysis, the large-cap segment consists of fragmented historical data. Therefore,
the results for the large-cap segment are inconclusive. However, complete historical data for
small and mid-cap firms is available.
Regression analysis is performed to determine the significance of the B/M ratio on the
returns of small and mid-cap firms. The analysis resulted in a p-value of .36 for small-cap firms
and .12 for mid-cap firms. Therefore, the B/M ratio is not a significant factor for small or midcap firms from 1982 - 2017. The results indicate that the B/M ratio does not generate greater
variability among returns within the mid-cap segment.
Table 12 presents average annualized returns for the portfolios sorted by size and OP.
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Table 12: Annualized average returns from 1982 – 2017 are presented for 100 portfolios
created through a bivariate sort on size and OP, excluding the smallest 10% of securities
based on Market Equity and Operating Profitability.

Small-Cap
Low 30% OP 12.17%
Mid 30% OP 14.07%
High 30% OP 15.47%

Mid-Cap
Low 30% OP 13.07%
Mid 30% OP 14.31%
High 30% OP 14.73%

Large-Cap
Low 30% OP
9.30%
Mid 30% OP 11.27%
High 30% OP 13.56%

The initial results suggest OP has a more direct relationship with stock returns than the B/M
ratio. Average returns increase as OP increases for each market equity segment. For example,
large-cap firms with the lowest 30% OP generate an average return of 9.30%, and the firms with
the largest 30% OP generate an average return of 13.56%. Regression analysis was performed
on average returns with respect to OP, and resulted in a p-value of .00 for small firms, .049 for
mid-cap firms, and .00 for large firms. The results suggest the relationship between OP and the
average return is significant for small, mid, and large-cap securities. However, the p-value of
.049 for mid-cap securities suggests OP is only slightly significant during the period.
Additionally, the most recent 25-year period was analyzed to determine if the significance is a
result of the period. The period 1992 – 2017 results in a p-value of .28 for mid-cap securities.
Therefore, OP is only slightly significant from 1982 – 2017, and the results suggest the
significance is only a result of the time period selected.
The results in tables 11 and 12 present convincing evidence that the mid-cap anomaly is
not a direct result of non-size related factors having a greater impact on the mid-cap segment.
The B/M ratio is not a statistically significant factor for mid-cap firms, and OP is less significant
for mid-cap firms than small and large firms. Further, OP appears to be significant as a result of
the period selected. Non-size related factors resulting in greater variation of mid-cap returns does
not appear to be a direct cause of the excess returns generated by mid-cap firms over the past 35years.
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Mutual Fund Analysis
Although the results fail to support the growth potential and non-size factor hypotheses,
they suggest mid-cap securities are somewhat immune to non-size related factors. Because midcap firms are less impacted by non-size related factors, it appears that the mid-cap anomaly is a
true anomaly that is not dependent on other factors. To further analyze this position, the study
questions if all mid-cap firms benefit from the mid-cap anomaly such that all mid-cap firms
benefit from the anomaly similarly, and is there less variation between the returns of mid-cap
firms than other market equity segments? In essence, attaining excess returns from buying
midcaps is solely dependent on buying any mid cap firms and not any specific mid-cap firms
related to other factors such as book-to-market or operating profits.
If all mid-cap firms perform similarly, one would expect the volatility among different
mid-cap mutual funds to be lower than the volatility among small-cap or large-cap mutual funds.
The results presented above suggest the mid-cap anomaly is not dependent on non-size related
factors. However, these factors appear to be more significant for the returns of small and large
firms. To test the theory, mutual fund returns from Morningstar’s mutual fund database were
analyzed. Table 13 illustrates average 5-year returns for each mutual fund category.
Table 13: Average 5-year returns of mutual fund categories are presented.
Growth
Small Cap
Mid Cap
Large Cap

Value
11.65%
11.98%
13.80%

9.16%
10.56%
10.63%

Blend
10.18%
10.65%
12.04%

Average returns are organized by market equity and investment-type (blend, value, and
growth). To evaluate the variation among the returns of small, mid, and large-cap mutual funds,
the study calculates a growth premium and a value premium. The growth premium and value
premium are calculated as follows,
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𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛;
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
The growth and value premium illustrate the excess returns generated by growth and value funds
in comparison to a blend of the market equity segment. The results are presented in table 14.
Table 14: The 5-year growth premium (Avg. growth return – Avg. blend return) and value
premium (Avg. value return – Avg. blend return) are presented for small, mid, and largecap mutual funds.
Growth Premium
Value Premium
Small cap
1.47
-1.02
Mid Cap
1.34
-0.08
Large Cap
1.77
-1.40

The results support the theory that lower volatility exists between mutual fund returns in the midcap segment than in the small-cap and large-cap segments. The growth and value premium for
mid-cap firms are closer to 0 than the premiums for small and large-cap firms. This suggests that
all mid-cap mutual funds perform similarly in comparison to small and large funds. To further
analyze the variation among mutual funds, 3- and 5-year standard deviations of mutual fund
returns were calculated, and are presented in tables 15 and 16.
Table 15: The standard deviation of 3-year average returns for mutual funds are presented
by segment.
Growth
Small Cap
Mid Cap
Large Cap

Value
3.00
2.48
2.99

Blend
2.98
2.38
1.96

2.79
2.36
2.70

Table 16: The standard deviation of 5-year average returns for mutual funds are presented
below by segment.
Growth
Small Cap
Mid Cap
Large Cap

Value
2.77
2.32
2.60
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Blend
2.78
2.11
2.22

2.57
2.03
2.18

The results suggest the 3- and 5-year standard deviation between mid-cap fund returns is lower
than that for small-cap funds, excluding the blend segment. Because returns vary less among
mid-cap funds, the requirement to screen mutual funds using non-size related factors is reduced.
However, it is critical that investors rely on non-size related factors and additional screens when
investing in small or large-cap mutual funds. Because there is greater dispersion between mutual
fund returns in the small-cap segment, screening with non-size related factors is critical to ensure
quality funds are selected. However, the screening requirement is lower when investing in midcap mutual funds, as the variation among fund returns is smaller.

Analysis of Results
The results support the existence of a mid-cap anomaly in the period 1982 – 2017.
Further, the anomaly does not appear to be dependent upon non-size related factors. Mid-cap
firms experience lower volatility, and the data suggests all firms within the segment benefit from
the anomaly. Conversely, excess returns generated in the small and large-cap segments appear to
be a result of non-size related anomalies, as these factors have a greater significance on the small
and large-cap segments.

V.

Conclusion & Recommendations
This study highlights the absence of the small-cap anomaly following its identification in

1980. Small-cap firms generate larger average returns than mid-cap firms from 1946 – 2017, but
the excess returns are not statistically significant. Additionally, mid-cap firms generate larger
average returns than small and large-cap firms from 1982 – 2017. The excess 3-year returns
generated by mid-cap firms in this period are statistically significant. Additionally, the small-cap
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anomaly is not statistically significant during either period analyzed, and is non-existent from
1982 – 2017.
The results suggest a mid-cap anomaly exists from 1982 – 2017. Not only do mid-cap
firms generate the highest risk-adjusted returns, but they also generate larger 1- and 3-year
average returns relative to small and large-cap firms. Statistical t-tests suggest the excess 3-year
returns of mid-cap firms are statistically significant. This gives evidence a mid-cap anomaly
exists and is statistically significant from 1982 – 2017.
This study hypothesized the mid-cap anomaly is a result of the excess growth potential of
growing firms. A hypothetical portfolio that excluded declining firms failed to generate
significantly larger average returns than the historical portfolio. Therefore, the growth potential
of firms does not appear to be a significant factor of the mid-cap anomaly. The study rejects the
hypothesis regarding growing firms.
The study also hypothesizes non-size related factors cause greater variation among
returns for the mid-cap segment, leading to the mid-cap anomaly. Using the B/M ratio and OP,
the study calculated the significance of the relationship between each factor and average returns
to determine if B/M and OP are significant factors in predicting returns for small, mid, and largecap firms. The results fail to support the hypothesis, and suggest B/M is not a significant factor
for mid-cap firms and OP achieves minimal significance as a result of the period analyzed.
Neither factor appears significant in comparison with the returns of mid-cap firms, suggesting
mid-cap securities have an immunity to non-size related factors. Because the returns of mid-cap
firms are less effected by the B/M ratio and OP, excess returns generated by mid-cap securities
appear to represent a legitimate anomaly that is not dependent on non-size related factors.
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Market value of equity appears to be the sole driver of the mid-cap anomaly. Although
small and large firms have outperformed in various historical periods, the results suggest the
outperformance is a result of non-size related factors. In other words, small-cap firms do not
outperform because of their size, but because non-size related factors such as OP significantly
influence their returns. This influence makes it necessary to sort with non-size related factors to
identify quality firms when investing in small and large-cap securities or mutual funds. Because
small and large firms generate more variable returns, there is a higher likelihood that individual
firms will underperform in these segments. The mid-cap anomaly appears to be a valid sizebased anomaly because size-related factors alone (market equity) generate excess returns.
Additional screening is less necessary when investing in mid-cap firms because the majority of
mid-cap firms benefit from simply being within this size range.
Mid-cap firms are more capable of adjusting to environmental and market changes than
large-cap firms. The smaller size of mid-cap firms reduces administrative bloat and allows the
firms to adapt more quickly. Faster adjustments result in a higher likelihood of success and
higher security returns within a fluid environment. In addition, mid-cap firms are less often
overwhelmed by interest costs and general economic contractions than small-cap firms because
they have greater financial resources. The study’s results suggest mid-cap firms are more capable
of adapting to market changes relative to large firms and less likely to fail due to economic
contractions relative to small-cap firms. This “happy” medium leads to higher risk-adjusted
returns and significantly higher average returns than small and large-cap firms.
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